Study on Chinese Influence Export Controls only Partially Protect Europe's Chip Know-How

A study classifies the Dutch semiconductor industry as particularly vulnerable to Chinese influence. This affects all of Europe, as Dutch companies hold key positions in manufacturing equipment, chips, and process knowledge.

The Dutch semiconductor industry is, according to the assessment of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), particularly at risk of Chinese interference (via Tom's Hardware). In the study "Beyond Borders" published in July 2026, the authors examine the methods China could use to influence strategically important industries in the Netherlands.

In addition to the semiconductor industry, the report examines the maritime economy as well as the aerospace sector. Among these three industries, the semiconductor sector is assessed by the authors to pose the highest strategic risk. This is determined by both the likelihood of influence and its potential economic, technological, and security-related consequences.

The assessment is based on publicly available sources as well as interviews with industry representatives and experts. The study itself was developed as part of the China Knowledge Network, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, according to HCSS, the authors alone are responsible for the content and conclusions. It is therefore not a risk assessment by the Dutch government but rather a strategic analysis by a research institute. The report is available from HCSS.

The Netherlands Occupies European Key Positions

The Dutch semiconductor sector holds a special position within the international value chain. ASML is the world's only manufacturer of EUV lithography systems, which are essential for producing highly advanced chips. Companies like NXP and Nexperia, as well as numerous suppliers and research institutions, are also part of the Dutch semiconductor ecosystem.

These technologies and expertise are particularly interesting for China, the authors argue. Despite significant investments, the country remains dependent on foreign technology for the production of advanced semiconductors.

This means the risk extends beyond the Netherlands. Equipment, components, and process knowledge from Dutch companies are relevant to semiconductor development and manufacturing across Europe. If proprietary knowledge is unlawfully leaked, it not only impacts the competitiveness of individual companies. Europe could also lose technological leadership and influence within the global semiconductor value chain.

In addition to the major manufacturers, the report also considers suppliers, service providers, and university collaborations as possible access points. Additionally, the movement of employees between companies and countries is highlighted. While sensitive production areas and development environments are relatively well protected, this does not necessarily apply to the entire industrial ecosystem.

As indications of the risk, the authors cite, among other things, the access by the hacker group Chimaera to NXP between 2017 and 2020, as well as known cases of ASML know-how leakage. However, the report does not reveal any new espionage cases.

Influence Extends beyond Cyberattacks

The study defines foreign influence as targeted and often difficult-to-detect activities through which a state seeks to influence or exploit another country's economic or technological systems. In the semiconductor sector, the authors mainly consider three possible approaches:

• Cyberattacks and digital economic espionage,
• the leakage of knowledge through employees and specialists,
• economic pressure through market access, investments, or critical raw materials.

These instruments could also be combined. For instance, a corporate stake could facilitate access to information, while resource dependencies could be used to exert economic pressure. This is evident in Europe's reliance on gallium and germanium. Both resources are needed for various semiconductor applications, while China controls a significant portion of their extraction and processing. Export restrictions could therefore impact not only Dutch companies but also international chip production.

Export Controls Do Not Cover All Risks

The Netherlands has already restricted the export of certain semiconductor and lithography technologies to China. Additionally, foreign investments in strategically relevant companies are being scrutinized more closely. According to HCSS, however, these measures primarily cover products, investments, and individual transactions.

They do not necessarily prevent knowledge from leaking through employees, research collaborations, or less protected parts of the supply chain. Gradually emerging dependencies in materials and sales markets can also only be partially addressed by these measures.

The authors therefore recommend, among other things, a national continuity strategy for the semiconductor sector. This should define which technologies, suppliers, and production capacities need special protection during a crisis. Additionally, enhanced security requirements for companies with advanced manufacturing technologies and risk-based, non-discriminatory security checks for particularly sensitive functions should be implemented.

A Possible Comparison with Taiwan

The protection of knowledge in the Netherlands is not completely unregulated. For instance, an expanded espionage law criminalizes the sharing of sensitive corporate information under certain conditions. This includes actions carried out for a foreign power that endanger important Dutch interests. The Dutch government explicitly cites the theft of high-tech knowledge as an applicable case.

Taiwan takes a more technology-focused approach. The country has classified particularly sensitive technologies as national core key technologies. The theft of related trade secrets for use abroad can therefore be prosecuted as a violation of the national security law. Based on this, the verdicts in the recent case involving stolen TSMC know-how were issued. The Taiwanese law provides for prison sentences as well as fines for involved companies.

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The HCSS report does not call for adopting this model. However, the comparison illustrates how the leakage of process knowledge could also be more precisely tracked alongside the export of equipment and products. For Europe, this raises the question of whether particularly sensitive semiconductor knowledge should be defined as clearly and protected more uniformly across national borders.